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Revie",s
The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of brief reviews
of books and articles (and perhaps films etc.) which are concerned in some way with the
rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human animals. These reviews will be both
critical and reportive--primarily reportive in the case of most scientific and historical
material, and increasingly critical as the material is more argumentative and philosophical.
The second part of this Section is entitled 'Second Opinions' and contains second (and
usually dissenting) reviews of works reviewed in the first part in earlier numbers of E&A.
After a review appears in E&A (and after the 'second opinion' if one appears within the-
next two numbers) the Editor will invite the author of the original work to submit a brief
rejoinder to the review(s). Rejoinders received will appear in the third part of the
Review Section. Members of the SSEA who wish to submit reviews (first or second), or
recommend works for review, should contact the Editor.

Books
R. G. Frey. I~TERESTS AND RIGHTS: THE CASE
AGAINST ANL~S (Oxford University Press),
1980.
This book might be more accurately sub
titled: the case against the case for
animals. It is an attack on the most popu
lar philosophical argument for some form
of animal liberation. Frey argues that
"the Nelsonian argument for the moral rights
of animals fails: its major premiss-
that all and only beings which (can) have
interests (can) have moral rights--is
dubious, and its minor premiss--that
animals as well as humans (can) have
interests--is false." One might have
thought that the minor premiss could be
established to most people's satisfaction
and that the real work would come in
evaluating the major premiss. Frey,
howeve~, says little about the major
premiss; most of his book is devoted to
trying to show that the minor premiss is
false. It turns out on Frey's views,
remarkably enough, that animals do not
have interests, desires, beliefs, emotions,
perceptions, or reasons. The linchpin
is the denial that animals have beliefs.

If 'have interests' means 'have a good
or well-being which can be harmed or
benefited' or 'have needs', then ani
mals have interests, says Frey, but so do
tractors--so that can't be the relevant
sense of 'interest'. If 'have interests'
means 'have wants', in the sense of 'have
desires', then animals do not have inter
ests because they do not have desires.
They do not have desires because they do
not have beliefs. They do not have
beliefs because they do not have language.
Because they do not have beliefs, they
also do not have perceptions, reasons,
emotions, or moral feelings. The bulk
of Frey's slim volume is devoted to
developing these claims; it is not
possible for me to consider here the
details of his arguments, which merit
consideration by philosophers, though
I suspect that his dry and graceless prose
will deter nonspecialists.
But how does this bear on the question
of how we should treat nonhumans? One
might have thought that if they have no
interests (indeed can't have interests)
then that is the end of the matter.
Apparently not. "But can animals be
wronged," asks Frey in his Postscript,
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"even if they have no interests? Yes, they
can. For . . . the 'higher' animals can
suffer unpleasant sensations and so . .
can be hurt; and wantonly hurting them,
just as wantonly hurting human beings
demands justifications, if it is not to
be condemned." Indeed, Frey says in his
final paragraph that "questions can still
be raised about our treatment of animals."
What, then, have we learned? We have
learned, according to Frey, that "the
answers cannot now consist in appeal to
or reliance upon moral rights." I have
no quarrel with this, but it is not enough.
While some versions of the pro-animal
argument have been tied to analyses of rights,
others have not. Peter Singer's, for
example, is not--as Frey recognizes--and
Singer's version is certainly the one most
influential among philosophers.
The problem with Frey's case against
animals (at least, one problem) is that it
is too broad. He has no faith in the con
concept of rights; he doesn't really believe
that humans have moral rights either.
"And one important thing this means is
that we have no moral right to an animal's
confinement in zoos, to its ceaseless
drudgery and labour on our behalf, to
ies persistent exploitation in the name of
cosmeti.cs, clothing, entertainment; and
sport, to its blindness, dismemberment,
and ultimate death in the name of science,
and, to be sure, to its appearance on our
dining-tables." The argument that animals
don't have rights has always taken place
against the background assumption that humans
do; if animals had no moral rights, while
humans did, then animals were thought
to occupy a lower moral status than humans.
This traditional argument attempted to
answer moral questions about how, at least
in general, animal welfare ought to be
weighed against human welfare. Frey's
argument, however, offers no such answers;
perhaps they are to be expected in the book,
~ODERN MORAL VEGETARIANISM, which he tells
us is in preparation. The present book,
however, does not in the end make a con
concrete case either for or against animals.
Frey's argument sometimes seems to
reach beyond the context where debate about
the moral status of nonhumans makes sense,
as when he attacks the assumption that
pain is in itself bad. "Why should
unpleasant sensations be regarded as
intrinsically evil?" Indeed, Frey considers
it a "very real possibility" that nothing
has intrinsic value (positive
(pOSitive or negative).

Such matters are certainly worth considering.
Though I find many of Frey's arguments con
confused or unconvincing, I think there are
some interesting questions buried in this
book. But there is no reason to believe
that their answers will tell against ani
animals any more than against us nonanimals.
Edward Johnson
University of
New Orleans

